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This thesis focuses on the organizational careers
of assistant district attorneys in an urban New England
city. It addresses three research questions:
1. What of significance can be learned about
the career patcerns of assistant district
attorneys by studying the office structure
of the district attorney's office?
2. What of significance can be learned about
assistant district attorneys attitudes and
behavior by studying their career patterns?
3. What of significance can be learned about
the administration of justice by studying
assistant district attorney's attitudes
and behaviors?
The methodology for this study was participant
observation based on field research. The author spent
approximately 250 hours observing activities and inter-
viewing officers of the superior court.
The office structure of the district attorney's
office has two salient characteristics -- prosecutors
are paid low salaries and allowed to develop a part-
time civil practice on the outside. As a result
attorneys enter the office for only one reason -- to
gain trial experience. When they have had this ex-
perience they leave the office. This career pattern
leads to a preoccupation with trying cases, and has an
adverse effect on the quality of legal administration.
Thesis Supervisor: John Van Maanen
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BLACK AUTHOR SLAIN BY 'EXECUTION SQUAD'
IN ROXBURY
A leader of the Malcolm X Foundation,
Hakim A. Jamal, 34, was assassinated in
his Roxbury home at 11 p.m. last night
by what police termed an execution sqad.
Jamal, author of a biography of slain
Muslum leader Malcolm X, was cut down
by fire from pistols and automatic weapons
in an apartment at 113 Townsend Street.
At least 12 shots were fired, police
said. The ceiling and walls of the
apartment were riddled with slugs.
(Boston Globe, May 2, 1973)
In our mass media today this and similar stories
are more the rule than the exception. The responses to
crime are apparent everywhere. Armed guards stand in
public schools. Shopkeepers keep their doors locked.
Bus drivers don't make change. The cities bristle
with new security devices, snarling guard dogs, added
police squads, and voluntary citizens' patrols. Violent
crime has become more an oppressive state of mind than
a soaring set of criminal statistics. In fact, the
statistics may reflect changes in the reporting
of crimes rather than dramatic increases in crime it-
self.
The federal government has responded to crime by
pouring hundreds of millions of dollars into the cof-
fers of local police, courts, and prisons. Yet dispite
the added resources our criminal justice system has
been ineffective in ameliorating public fears. Quite
often these institutions have responded with iron-fisted
techniques, such as invasion of property without search
warrants, mass arrests, or roughing up prisoners in the
paddy wagon. A recent example occurred in Collinsville,
Illinois.
It is a quiet little law-and-order town.
Victorian houses with cool shadowy par-
lors line the pleasant streets; dogwood
trees shade the lawns; and the noise and
sin of St. Louis are a safe 15 miles off to
the west, beyond the Mississippi River.
But the humid indolence of Collinsville,
Ill., evaporated abruptly one night last
month. As the story emerged last week,
two squads of Federal narcotics agents -
brandishing pistols and shotguns, but
notably lacking search warrants - de-
scended on two suspected dope dens,
and got the wrong house both times. "I
used to have nightmares when I was a
little girl," shudders Mrs. Evelyn
Giglotto, 28, one of the victims of the
monumental blunder. "But never like this."
The nightmare started not long after
dark. Mrs. Giglotto, a pretty young wom-
an, and her husband, Herbert, a 29-year-
old construction worker with a cheery
beer belly, were asleep in their apart-
ment on the outskirts of Collinsville
when the narcs arrived. Disguised in
beards and the tattered vestments of
the counter-culture, the raiders crept
past the tulips in the yard, kicked down
the front door and streamed into the
the Giglottos' apartment. "They threw
me down on the bed on my stomach, put
handcuffs behind my back, pointed a
pistol at me and said: 'You s.o.b.,
you move, you're dead'," Giglotto re-
called later. "I thought, these goddamned
hippies are going to kill us."
While Mrs. Giglotto, dressed in a green
negligee, looked on in horror, the
raiders stormed through the apartment
for half an hour. They battered the
bedroom furniture, yanked down book-
shelves, scattered clothes in the closet,
overturned the television set, smached a
Polaroid camera and shattered a prized
plaster-of-Paris dragon in the hall.
"Where's it at?" the leader of the raiding
party bellowed at Giglotto. "Who's this
whore in the bed?" (Newsweek, May 14, 1973)
The raiders finally left when they discovered some in-
surance papers indicating the "narcs" had raided the
wrong house.
Given this state of affairs, it isn't surprising
that the current popular scene is divided into two
warring camps. On one side are those who view police-
men, prison guards, and judges as brutal and fascist
individuals. They feel the main problem lies in pro-
tecting individual rights and due process. The other
side views criminals as cancerous growths who must be
removed from society. They feel the main problem lies
in making the criminal justice system more effective
in deterring crime. President Nixon supported the latter
view when he recently spoke to the nation. He blamed
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crime on "permissiveness" in general, and "soft-headed
judges" intent on "coddling" criminals in particular.
I feel that both groups have neglected what I call
the "organizational perspective". Each of the three
elements in the criminal justice system has its own
culture which largely determines the actions of the
people who work within its boundaries.
Schein (1970) proposed the following working defini-
tion of an organization:
An organization is the rational coordin-
ation of the activities of a number of
people for the achievement of some common
explicit purpose or goal, through division
of labor and function, and through a
hierarchy of authority and responsibility.
An important point in this definition must be noted --
it is activities which are coordinated. From the organi-
zational point of view, it is sufficient to spell out
these activities or "roles" which must be fulfilled in
order to achieve the goal. To a large extent it is the
organization which determines the actions of individuals,
and not the individuals themselves.
Perhaps the most startling example of this pheno-
menon occurred in an experiment conducted by Philip
Zimbardo at Stanford University in the summer of 1971.
He selected a homogeneous group of middle-class white
males for the experiment, then randomly selected half
the group to be "prisoners" and the other half into
"guards". Then he systemmatically created the structure
and climate of a prison. Within a matter of days the
prisoners became a submissive slouching set of in-
dividuals without organization or leadership. The
guards, in contrast, grew into swaggering dominant
brutes reminiscent of Nazi concentration camp guards.
In this experiment the actions of individuals were
clearly dominated by the roles assigned to them by the
institution represented by Professor Zimbardo. After
five months of observation in the superior courts, it
is my strong feeling that the actions of the assistant
district attorneys are controlled by the structure of
the organization they work in.
II. Methodology
I adopted the naturalistic methodology of partici-
pant observation. Denzin (1970) explains the goals of
participant observation as:
,..the avowed commitment on the part of
the investigator to participate as in-
timately as possible in the experiences
of those he studies. This demands that
he learn their language and understand the
actions surrounding their valued social
objectives. The meaning of their styles
of dress and modes of gesturing must also
be grasped. The observer must, to the
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extent of his abilities, learn to view
the world of his subjects from their
perspective. Preconceptions and stero-
types must be forsaken; a flexible and
relativistic stance must be adopted.
From October 1972 until May 1973 I visited the
superior courts of an urban industrialized New England
city. During this time, I spend between 200 and 250
hours watching court proceedings and talking to court
personnel. At 9:30 a.m. on October 26, 1972, I entered
the superior courts as a complete stranger. I intro-
duced myself as a student trying to learn how the courts
worked. I observed the court at work and noted what was
said and where people stood. I asked questions about
what I saw happen and as people explained the events to
me, I took notes of their comments. I attempted with
varying degrees of success to absorb all the data flood-
ing my senses. Soon people began to give me pamphlets
and books describing things they felt I should know.
At night I typed my notes and read the materials I was
given. The next day I would ask questions I developed
the night before. Soon I became a well-known fixture in
the courts.
My intent was to study the entire court system. I
wanted to identify key actors, and then find out what
motivated their actions. In this process I talked at
length to everyone I met -- judges, clerks of court,
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probation officers, public defenders, prosecutors,
defense attorneys, policemen, county sheriffs, court
stenographers, secretaries, and defendants. At first I
spent most of my time in the "assignment session". This
court functions as a switchboard -- assigning some cases
to "trial sessions" for an actual trial, while post-
poning others. It also handles arraignments, pre-
liminary motions, and guilty pleas. Later I visited
trial sessions.
As I visited the courts the district attorney's
office began to take on particular interest. Defense
attorneys told me, "The district attorneys really run
this place." Public defenders complained about
sentences from plea bargaining, "The recommendations
are consistently high. In fact, you could say insane."
A judge told me that except for the high crime rate,
"inefficiency in the district attorneys office" was the
main reason for growing case backlogs. And a probation
officer told me, "Part-time defenders of the public
concern is simply not a proper way to run the district
attorney's office."
As I began to examine the district attorneys office
in early February several things stood out. Most of the
district attorneys I saw in the courts were young. In
the space of a month, two of the men left the office.
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One joined his father's firm, while the other signed on
with a prestigious civil trial firm. I was told a number
of defense lawyers I saw in court daily had formerly
been assistant district attorneys. One assistant dis-
trict attorney told me, "Most assistants are only in the
office from two to five years, and come here directly
from law school." It soon became clear that "career"
was a powerful parameter in thinking of the assistant
district attorneys.
After some thought I began to wonder if there might
not be a link between the problems people told me about,
and the assistant district attorneys' career patterns.
To examine the possibility closer I interviewed eleven
assistant district attorneys during the month of March.
During April and early May I examined the interview
data, read material on organizational careers, con-
ducted a literature search on district attorney's
offices, and wrote this document. See Appendix A for a
more complete view of this process.
To what extent have I been able to capture, "Truth"
in these descriptions and analyses? As Orne (1962)
has shown fairly conclusively the subjects of a care-
fully controlled psychological experiment respond not
only to the experimental design, but also to the biases
and involuntary cues that the experimenter gives. Sub-
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jects respond to the demand characteristics of the ex-
periment and do things that they would not otherwise do.
For reasons not quite clear, Rosenthal (1967) has
suggested that subjects alter their behaviors so as to
confirm the hypotheses the experiment expects to be
confirmed. Given this aspect of human nature, why should
we believe the results of field experiments?
Howard S. Becker (1958) has suggested at least two
reasons why field studies are reliable. First, since
the observer is participating in a natural setting, the
people there are subject to organizational demands
which cannot be ignored. As a result the actions taken
by these being studied will tend to be "honest", even if
they explain those actions in a somewhat biased manner.
Second, since the field observer is present over a long
period of time, it is possible for him to continually
test his initial assumptions and hypotheses. A third
reason lies in the setting of this specific study. I
came to the courts without any preconceived theories or
hypotheses to test. All of the descriptions and analysis
I present were developed from conversations or actions
I witnessed in the field. Since I had no hypothesis to
prove, the assistant district attorneys had no way of
knowing how they were "supposed" to react.
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III. Research Questions
This thesis will examine the district attorneys
office in order to address three questions:
1. What of significance can be learned about the
career patterns of assistant district attorneys
by studying the office structure of the district
attorneys office?
2. What of significance can be learned about
assistant district attorneys' attitudes and
behavior by studying their career patterns?
3. What of significance can be learned about the
the administration of justice by studying
assistant district attorneys' attitudes and
behaviors?
Chapter I reviews the literature to find relevant
research that has previously been done on public prose-
cutors.




Chapter III analyzes the structure of the district
attorney's office in my study, and documents the effect
of the structure on the assistant district attorney's
organizational careers.
Chapter IV reports the influence that one particular
organizational career pattern has on prosecutors attitudes
and behaviour -- a preoccupation with trying cases.
Chapter V indicates the adverse effect that this
preoccupation has on the quality of legal administration.
- PREVIOUS WORK ON PUBLIC PROSECUTORS
This chapter will acquaint the reader with typical
research in the literature on public prosecution.
Material that is particularly relevant to my study will
be noted. Most of the previous work in the field has not
been focused on the district attorney's office. Instead
the work has followed one of three main approaches.
Some researchers have concentrated on a problem area,
the most common one being plea bargaining. Others have
described the entire court system of which the pro-
secutors office is one part. The third focus has been
on the top official, the district attorney.
Alschuler (1968) and Vetri (1964) have singled out
plea bargaining for their attention. Alschuler first
examined the prosecutors' basic motives in granting con-
cessions during plea bargaining. He cites a 1964 study
showing that the strength of the case is the most often
mentioned reason for reducing charges (mentioned by 85%
of the prosecutors in the survey). Other important
factors are the volume of work (37%), the prosecutors'
feelings that the law is too harsh (32%), and sympathy
for the defendant (27%). Then he discussed the problem
of overcharging by the prosecutor. In order to grant
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CHAPTER I
concessions, the prosecutor must be able to reduce the
charges to less serious crimes, or eliminate some of
the crimes filed. This dynamic leads the prosecutor to
file extra charges or more serious charges against the
defendant, this "overcharging" him. Alschuler also
discusses the strategy of bluffing and compromise from
the perspective of the defense attorney as well as that
of the prosecutor. As his final analysis of plea bar-
gaining, he feels that it does not merit sweeping
condemnation as either too harsh or too generous. It is
as irrational in its mercies as in its punishments. It
is simply inconsistent.
In a section of Alschuler's work relevant to my
thesis, he relates the experience of Richard Kuh, former
Administrative Assistant to the district attorney in
Manhattan. Reflecting on his experience, Kuh notes that
a trial assistant's bargaining concessions may be in-
fluenced by his own career objectives in two ways. First,
most prosecutors have taken their position in a district
attorney's office in order to gain the necessary trial
experience to move into private practice. As a result,
the position as a trial assistant in a felony court is
among the most prized assignments young prosecutors can
secure. The competition for these assignments is there-
fore fierce, and felony trial assistants fear that losing
many cases may result in replacement. This possibility
is not a strong factor in the district attorney's office
studied in this thesis. The individual assistants here
do not bargain in their cases; plea bargaining is done by
only a few assistants. Second, Kuh states that few pro-
secutors plan to make a career out of the district
attorneys office. Most will become defense lawyers. As
a result good relations with defense attorneys and judges
become a vital building block for a future career. This
fact reinforces a prosecutor's natural desire to be liked
Both considerations may lead to unwarranted generosity.
The second approach has been to examine the entire
court system and see how the district attorney's office
fits in. Warner (1936) studied the Suffolk County Superior
Courts in Boston. He noted that cases are seldom
adequately prepared for trial and felt that this resulted
from the increasing caseloads. He provided some crude
statistics showing an inverse relationship between case-
loads of the prosecutors and the percentage of con-
victions obtained.
Blumberg (1967) describes the municipal criminal
court in which the district attorney's office is one
part. His approach suggests that the criminal court is
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one part of the "community screen" which sifts out and
"labels" deviants. During Blumberg's case study he
noted that politics is much less an integral part of the
district attorney's office than it once was. The chief
prosecutor there has furthered the public service image
of the office by recruiting assistant district attorneys
from among graduates of leading law schools. He is
recruited for his scholastic ability and not his politi-
cal connections. He is wholly dependant on his superiors
for employment recommendations when he moves on --
whether he moves into private practice or on to another
political office. As in any other bureaucratic set-
ting, the rewards are dispensed only to those who have
played the game by conforming to the desires of their
superiors.
The need for employer recommendations in this set-
ting would be an important reward, which could then be
used as a means for socializing the young attorney into
office norms. One could also examine the district
attorney's office functioning as an employment bureau.
Neither of these two possibilities appeared relevant
during my research on this thesis.
The office in Blumberg's study was is divided into
six bureaus. Each assistant must file a daily report on
any plea bargaining proceedings. Each case must be
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accounted for as a "unit of production." As Blumberg
states, "At the annual office banquet it is customary
for the district attorney to praise his staff in glowing
terms, especially for their "batting average", which is
an omnipresent standard of performance.
Blumberg also notes that most assistants only stay
for three to five years until they make a connection or
take some other appropriate step upward in their career.
This career pattern also describes the situation in the
district attorney's office in my work. As Blumberg said,
"Usually it is the 'failures' who remain behind to be-
come bureau heads in the office or assume other super-
visory functions."
Nedrud (1960) followed the third approach of con-
centrating on the chief officer in the office. He
examined the district attorney by analyzing the statutes
providing for the office of public prosecutor in the
first 48 states. As a former prosecuting attorney, he
was interested in collecting information along these
dimensions: jurisdiction, methods of selection, employment
basis -- part-time or full-time, salary, and selection of
assistants. Primarily because of salary he concludes
that "... very few, if any, state statutes give any in-
centive to a lawyer to become a 'Career Prosecutor'.
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Nedrud's work strongly influenced the Task Force
Report: The Courts (1967). The Task Force examined the
problems caused by district attorneys and their
assistants who are only part-time employees. They felt
that a part-time practice outside the office will natural-
ly lead to some conflicts of interest. The Task Force
also felt that the political orientation of the office
was an obstacle to effective prosecution. As a result
they recommended that each jurisdiction support a full-
time district attorney and staff whenever possible.
Although the foci of the previous studies were not
career patterns, they do shed light on the "typical
career" of an assistant prosecuting attorney. Most
assistants have recently graduated from law school, and
view the prosecutor's office as a necessary first step
in his legal career. He will stay in the office between
three to five years before moving into private practice.
In addition, Alschuler indicated how career pattens
could influence the manner in which an assistant pro-
secutor goes about his business.
One final study, has taken an approach dif-
ferent from any one of the three approaches mentioned
above. The American Bar Foundation in conjunction with
the National District Attorneys Association conducted
research in 1968 and 1969 with an interesting orienta-
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tion. They utilized experienced prosecutors to analyze
and describe another prosecutor's office of comparable
size, but whose policies and organization were different
from their own home offices. In this exchange format,
the prosecutors from Baltimore and Houston examined each
other's office, while Brooklyn and Los Angeles prosecutors
did the same. One year was scheduled for the exchange.
Five months were spent observing and collecting data with
the remaining seven months writing up the major findings.
Working with the prosecutors was a sociologist who brought
the perspectives of his discipline.
These reports appeared in The Prosecutor (1969).
David Lippman, the sociologist involved in this research
summarized the findings as follows:
Independently, each of the four assistant
prosecutors have isolated two problems
which they feel are of overriding importance:
(1) the control of a criminal case from
arrest through conviction, and (2) the main-
tenance of the professionalism of assistant
prosecutors. At first glance, these two
topics appear to have little in common, but
actually they comprise two sides of the
same dilemma -- that is, the conflict of
the professional operating in a bureaucratic
organization. Criminal law based on the
common law tradition believes that each
case should be decided on its own merits.
This is also the tradition upon which the
professionalism of the bar is based. Two
conusel, acting as adversaries, seek to
obtain the best possible disposition of
the case for the interests that they rep-
resent. However, this tradition is not
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easily amenable to the operation of large
organizations which characterize urban
criminal justice administration. Large
organizations develop levels of authority,
divide duties in the most efficient manner,
and attempt to standardize (rationalize)
their practices through directives from
the top. They need systems to train new
members into the organization, to handle
paperwork and keep records, and to evaluate
and rate the performance of employees.
These necessary bureaucratic elements of
an efficient office all oppose what lawyers
consider to be professional conduct. Bureau-
cracies seek to diminish conflict while the
lawyer views himself as an adversary in a
situation which has as its major character-
istic, conflict.
Lippman has articulated the tension which exists
when professional norms conflict with bureaucratic
needs. His statement appears just as applicable to
professors in a university or doctors in a hospital.
As will be shown in Chapter V, a lawyer's professional
norms do adversely affect the quality of legal adminis-
tration.
- ORGANIZATIONAL CAREER THEORY
This chapter will acquaint the reader with organ-
izational career theory relevant to this study on one
district attorney's office. Glaser (1968) explains the
difference between organizational career and occupa-
tional career:
An occupational career is a very general
category referring to a patterned path
of mobility wherever it may take people
geographically, organizationally, and
socially while following a certain type
of work. An organizational career, in
contrast, is a specific entity offered
by an organization to people working in
it, using its services, or buying its
goods."
Glaser goes on to suggest that the properties of organi-
zational careers are prime determinants of the behavior
of the people within the organization. Although this
assertion appears valid for one district attorney's
office, the topic of careers is a neglected one in most
sociological analyses and descriptions of organizations.
Many career articles take a social-psychological or
social-interaction perspective. For example, Hughes
(1937) indicates that career patterns is one of the means
a person uses to shape his self-perceptions along such
dimensions as his competence, his responsibility, his
station in life, and his identity.
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CHAPTER II
Subjectively, a career is the moving per-
spective in which the person sees his life
as a whole and interprets the meaning of
his various attributes, actions, and things
which happen to him. This perspective is
not absolutely fixed either as to point of
view, direction or destination.
By the same token, a person's career allows others to
appraise him along those same attributes.
Wilensky (1960) emphasizes the efficacy of careers
in structuring a persons view of himself, and argues it
has implications for the society at large. He refers to
Riesman, et al. (1959) and Whyte (1956):
Consider three dimensions of careers --
number of ranks, career curve, organiza-
tional setting. Given Riesman and Whyte
a sympathetic reading and putting their
observations in this context, we may state
the Organization Man theme as follows:
Certain attributes of a class of large,
complex organizations and of one type of
career shape the work behaviour and life
style of middle managers and technicians.
At work, these men play it safe, seek
security, cultivate smooth human relations.
In the community they put down many but
shallow roots; they pick up and drop
friends the way they buy and trade cars
and homes -- speeding up the obsolescence
of both.
This is a life style which is active, group-
centered, conforming and fluid -- a pseudo-
community pattern, unguided by stable values.
Behavior both at work and off work is char-
acterized by expedient conformity ("If I
don't do this, I'll get into trouble")and
by other-direction, or conformity as a way
of life whatever the content of values and
norms conformed to ("A man should get along
with the gang"). 26
This thesis does not attempt to examine such a
broad societal context, but Wilensky's interpretation
indicates that "career" is a conceptually powerful tool.
Hughes propsal for self-appraisal via careers relies
heavily on the way a person moves through the organiza-
tional structure. Becker and Strauss (1956) focus on
several aspects of this mobility within the organization,
which they term "Career Flow":
An ideally simple model of flow up through
an organization is something like the fol-
lowing: recruits enter at the bottom in
positions of least prestige and move up
through the ranks as they gain in age,
skill, and experience. Allowing for some
attrition, due to death, sickness, and
dismissal or resignation, all remain in
the organization until retirement. Most
would advance to top ranks.
They also note that there may be a number of streams
which lead to positions of prestige and responsibility.
They think of these routes metaphorically as escalators.
Needless to say, the simple model they describe
depends largely on the shape and size of the organiza-
tion. A multi-billion dollar conglomerate offers a much
wider assortment of escalators than the local sporting
goods store.
Roth (1963) is concerned with the speed of the
escalators. He asserts that people will not accept
uncertainty, but will try to organize it into some
framework. 27
One way to structure uncertainty is to
structure the time period through which
uncertain events occur. Such a structure
must usually be developed from information
gained from the experience of others who
have gone or are going through the same
events. As a result of such comparisons,
norms develop for entire groups about when
certain events may be expected to occur.
When many people go through the same series
of events, we speak of this as a career and
of the sequence and timing of events as
their career timetable.
Thus far we have discussed three topics which have
particular relevance to the district attorney's office:
(1) the influence of career movement in shaping one's
self perceptions, (2) movement of the individual through
the organization, and (3) the existence of career time-
tables.
Schein (1971) proposed a model which is helpful
in tying these ideas together. He conceives of the
organization as a three dimensional cone, and movement
within the organization can occur in any one of the
three dimensions:
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1. Vertical Movement -- corresponding roughly to
the notion of increasing or decreasing rank in
the organization.
2. Radial Movement -- corresponding roughly to
the notion of centrality, being "on the inside."
3. Circumferential Movement -- corresponding roughly
to the notion of changing division in the organ-
ization.
Corresponding to the three types of movement, one can
also identify three types of boundaries dividing an organ-
ization: Heirarchy boundaries, Inclusion boundaries, and
Departmental boundaries. The diagram below represents a




The thoughts of the preceding people are central to
the work in the rest of this thesis. The next chapter
will deal with organizational structure (Schein) and its
impact on career movement within the organization (Becker
and Strauss) and career timetables (Roth). The following
chapter will discuss the influence of a particular or-
ganizational career on the attitudes and behaviors of
people who take the role of assistant district attorney.
30
CHAPTER III - OFFICE STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATIONAL
CAREERS
This chapter will explore the link between organiza-
tion structure and the organizational career offered to
assistant district attorneys. After describing the
office structure, I will build a model of the organiza-
tion based on Schein's work discussed in the previous
chapter. Then I will document the effect on prosecutor
career patterns.
I. District Attorney's Office
Three governmental jurisdictions fund positions in
the district attorneys office: the state, the county,




3 at $13,700 5 at $8,000 13 at $12,000
10 at $11,400 1 at $11,400
2 at $10,000
These personnel work in three functional areas,
each of which is run by an assistant district attorney
at the $13,700 level. 1) The first is the district
court prosecutors program, which involves thirteen
attorneys who try cases in the district court. It is
entirely funded by the LEAA. 2) The second functional
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II. Salaries
The salaries that the assistants make are extremely
low. A new member of the office makes only $8,000 per
year even though he has gone to law school for three years
and has passed the bar exam. Only one of the assistants
earns more that $11,400. The pay is extremely low because
the legislature and the county government pay for only
"part-time" prosecutors. As one member of the staff
told me:
The legislature sets up the structure of
the office, and will pay for only part-
time lawyers. Every year a rumor goes
around that we will be going to work for
twelve months, but we know we are still
on for ten. We get two months off in
the summer. Since we are only part-time
we can leave at 1:00 when we're not on
trial. For example just told me
a few minutes ago he was going over to
his office.
Another said:
They pay us so little because they say
that we're only part-time attorneys, but
I don't have any time for private practice
when I go home. When I'm on trial I'm so
tired at the end of the day that I just
want to go home and go to sleep. I can't
go back to my office.
Another said:
It's almost insulting now the poor wages
they pay. It's such a joke because they
claim its only a part-time job, but its
really full-time. The caseloads are too
heavy for this to be a part-time job.
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Another explained:
Of course, lawyers have always started
at pretty low salaries. That's because
when a person gets out of law school he
knows nothing about being a lawyer. He
is just ready to start learning the law
and needs someone to pay him to learn
it. A young attorney needs experience,
and there is always someone there to
exploit him.
Each of the eleven people interviewed felt their
salary was much too low. During one interview the
assistant district attorney complained about salaries as
he read through the vote of the state legislature
which had just defeated a bill to increase prosecutors'
salaries. He was taking a mental note of the legislators
who voted against the bill.
III. Civil Practice Outside the District Attorney's
Office
Because their jobs are only part-time, most attorneys
in the office also maintain an outside practice. Nine
of the eleven have some civil work. They are not allowed
to do any criminal work. One of the two who doesn't have
any civil practice just passed the State Bar Examination
in March, so he could not be expected to have an out-
side practice. As one assistant district attorney
explained:
Most of us in the office have a private
practice on the outside, and I write some
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briefs in my small civil practice. I get
this work through the man who was my
attorney.
Another said:
My private practice includes some bank
work and some corporate work, but mostly
it is probate and general practice. I
do all the work at night.
(Where do the cases come from?)
Most of them are referred from associates.
(From people you met through the office?)
No, that is against the rules of the office.
Mostly from attorneys I have met socially.
I have only a small practice since I don't
have much time to work on it.
Another conversation went like this:
Working here is tough on us because we
are only supposed to be part-time.
(Does this mean you have a practice out-
side the office?)
Yes. Most of the people here in the office
also have some outside work in areas like
probate, land court, adoption, titles and
bank work. The rules we work under stipu-
late that you can't pick up a client here
in the district attorney's office. It's also
illegal to take a referral from here. I
always ask clients when they come to me
where they got my name, just to make sure
they don't come through this channel.
Typically they know my family or they have
met me somewhere else so its O.K.
The referral process mentioned here also helped
five attorneys get their jobs in the district attorney's
office. Usually a fried of both the applicant and the
district attorney put the two of them in touch. The
process works like this:
My own attorney introduced me to the
district attorney. I guess they have
a connection through a judge or some-
thing. This doesn't happen to every-
body, though, because I know
walked in off the street and got a job.
This last statement agrees with comments others
made. Four assistnats did not get their jobs through a
referral process. They were accepted through the public
application procedure.
IV. The Attractiveness of Trial Experience
So far we have seen that the salaries for the
assistants are low and that they develop an outside
practice to help make ends meet. Given these facts, why
would anyone come to the district attorney's office?
There is a plum in the otherwise lean pudding -- trial
experience. As one staff member said:
I was graduated from law school last June
and tried to find a job in a small firm.
I was interested in trial work, although
entirely on the civil side. I had three
opportunities: one in a small firm, one
in a firm doing general litigation, and
one here. I took this position, because
I had a chance to do quite a bit of trial
work, and that's important to me. Most
of the work I want to do is in the civil
trial area, and the strategy I learn here
will be applicable in that field as well.
I was afraid if I had gone into a small
firm I would never get into court to try
cases. I'm here to do trial work and not
primarily to practice criminal law.
Another assistant said:
(If the salaries are so bad why did you
come here?)
Trial experience. That's the only reason
anyone is here. It certainly isn't for the
money. I'm here for the experience and the
esprit de corps (subject laughed). Trial
experience is the toughest thing to get as
an attorney, but you really need to get it
early. When you learn how to run a criminal
trial most of this carries over into civil
law. For example, how to pick a jury, what
kinds of arguments are important in opening
and closing statements, and general pro-
cedures.
Two of those interviewed are in other functional areas
(one in appellate and one in the districe court pro-
secutors program) and one performs a specialized non-
trial task in the office. The remaining eight assistant
district attorneys came to the office primarily for
trial experience. This is also true for those who have
been members of the Bar for five or ten years before
coming to the district attorney's office. In these two
cases it appears that they wanted to change their legal
speciality to trial work.
36
area is handled by two attorneys who deal with all appeals
arising from trials in the superior court. This includes
writing briefs, and presenting oral arguments to the
state supereme court. 3) The personnel in the third area
handle the preparation and trial of all cases in the
superior courts of the county. Cases may come to the
superior court from the district court or by direct in-
dictments from the grand jury. This division is managed
by the first assistant district attorney, who also over-
sees the other two functional areas. It is this division
of the district attorney's office that was studied.
The first assistant manages a group of nineteen
assistant district attorneys who handle all the trial
work in the superior courts. He has responsibility for
controlling the budget, assigning cases to individual
assistants, and general office management. He also does
a large part of the plea bargaining while delegating the
rest to a few assistants. One of the assistants in the
office handles most of the work with the grand jury, and
another tries only murder cases. The two people in this
division paid by the LEAA handle specialized work --
expediting trial dates, and insuring that all the superior
court sessions are kept busy. The remaining fourteen
assistant district attorneys try cases.
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As one said:
I had ten years of general practice
before I came here. I came here because
of the opportunity I would have to do a
lot of trial work. In general practice
you seldom get into court, but in this
office you try cases all the time.
My impression of public defenders indicates that
they also want trial experience. One district attorney
explained the difference.
I wouldn't want to be a public defender.
All they do is plea bargain, while we
try cases.
There may also be some ideological differences, but this
is a moot point. Two of those interviewed denounced
President Nixon's draconian attitude toward crime.
One said:
I don't like the basic philosophy he
is using. You can punish an addict all
you want, but they will still shoot up.
Even if you told them you would eloctro-
cute them tomorrow they still wouldn't
kick the habit.
On the other hand, two members of the office
expressed different opinions. One experieced hand
felt that criminals had been treated too leniently:
President Nixon is right, we have just
been too permissive in the past.
Until these people (criminals) learn
their lesson we're going to send them
back until they're in prison forever.
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Among the newer district attorneys I found no
ideological reason for selecting the district attorney's
office in preference to the public defenders office --
only practical reasons like trial experience.
V. Advancement In The District Attorney's Office
In any event, most attorneys come to the office
to gain trial experience. As one might expect, the kind
of case an assistant tries changes with experience. One
explained the process as follows:
When a young fellow comes in we send him
across the street to try misdemeanors. The
district court judge over there is pretty
informal, so the atmosphere isn't as tense
as it is here in the superior courts. This
gives him a chance to get his feet wet be-
fore he starts doing serrious felony cases.
Another assistant explained this process in greater
detail:
(How does promotion occur within the district
attorneys office?)
If by promotion you mean pay raises, then
those are limited by the statutes. When
there is a vacancy everyone moves up a step.
It is sort of moving up by attrition.
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(Does that imply that there are other
kinds of promotions besides pay raises?)
Yes, but promotion is really not the right
word -- the word is really greater responsi-
bility. I'm not thinking of anyone in parti-
cular, but if someone had been here for three
years and only tried misdemenors, then you
would know that people don't feel that he was
responsible.
(What are the levels of responsibility?)
Well in the beginning you work in the six-
man jury in the district court, and then
after a while you move up to the superior
court. Here at first you start trying
larceny and breaking and entering cases.
Then after a while you get assigned more
serious cases -- armed robberies, rapes
and murders. You may also get involved in
a major investigation. In these complex
investigations your judgement is crucial
everyday.
(How long does it take for this to happen?)
There is no set time for getting more re-
sponsibility, it depends more on the
individual. Somwhere along the line the
decisions are made and you either are
given more responsibility, stay where you
are, or go down hill.
(How are the cases assigned?)
The first assistant district attorney
assigns all the cases.
When I asked the first district attorney how he assigned
the cases to people he replied:
It all depends on the way they conduct
the cases they do handle. Of course,
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I personally can't watch everything, but
word does get back about how an assistant
handles trials. We get reactions from
judges, and other people in the court room.
Misdemeanors are important just as well as
the felonies and can be just as technical
and more difficult to try than heavy cases.
In an uttering case, which is basically
forgery, you may have to call in some
technical specialists as witnesses. It can
be very tricky. Then as that fellow moves
up, we bring in someone to fill in behind
him.
The assistant district attorneys said that the rate
of advancement depends on experience and ability. Its
hard to understand precisely what "ability" means. The
first assistant, who makes the assignment decisions,
indicates that it is not just winning or losing the
case. The fact would imply that an extremely broad
interpretation may be used. "Ability" could also include
attitudes towards the office or towards crime. One
would expect that such a reward system would be linked to
the process of socialization -- getting new members of the
office to accept office norms. In any event there appears
to be an "average" progression. One assistant explained
it like this:
(How long does it take to try important
cases?)
About 1 1/2 years although it depends on
ability. Usually its about six months to
one year working on misdemeanors, and then
a year to a year and a half working on
felony misdemeanors. After that you get to
work on the big ones.
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IV. Structural Model Of The District Attorney's Office
At this point we should return to Scheinb model
of an organization discussed in Chapter II. In order to
diagram this district attorney's office one needs to
define all three dimensions. Rank and function and re-
latively straightforward. Schein indicates that
measuring centrality is difficult to do because the very
existence of inclusion boundaries usually remains im-
plicit. This observer contends that the proper measure-
ment of centrality is simply the kind of trial an assis-
tant district attorney can try. The prosecutor who tries
murders is more central than one who tries breaking and
entering. The prosecutor who tries B & E is more central
than one who tries driving under the influence of alcohol.
With this perspective, a diagram of the district attor-
ney's office would appear as follows:
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The structure has a wide base which then turns into
a sharp narrow peak similar to a funnel. When a new
assistant district attorney enters the organization he
earns only $8,000, but he has much experience to gain.
After two or three years, he is trying "heavy" cases and
making only $11,400. By comparison an engineering
graduate with a bachelor of science degree and no ex-
perience can expect ot make the same salary. The pro-
secutor has nothing else to gain -- he can't expect any
increases in salary, and there are no higher levels of
trial experience. He is caught in the narrow mouth of
the organizational funnel.
The attorney could adapt in either of two ways. He
could view the job of assistant district attorney as a
guaranteed source of income, and make this one part of
his professional practice. For example, he could
allocate 50% of his time to this job and spend 50% else-
where. The second method of adapting would be simpler --
leave the office completely. This method would be
preferable if he were offered an outside position, or
felt his current civil practice would support him.
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VII. Career Patterns
Most assistant district attorneys prefer to leave.
Few of them think of the office as a career opportunity.
Instead they view the prosecutor's office as an excellent
step towards reaching their ideal -- going into practice
for themselves, or joining one of the excellent firms in
the area. As a result the turnover in the office is
high -- during the last year six men left. As one
assistant said:
When left he reached the pinacle
of what all of us here want to do -- go
to work for a good law firm or have the
opportunity to work for yourself. In my
mind having your own practice is second
only to being a judge. If the district
attorney's office paid like they do in
Westchester County there would be some
sort of a future, but there isn't now.
Another said:
I'm planning on staying about two years.
I think thats about how long was
here before he made first assist-ant and
then he stayed another two years after
that. People usually leave because of
money pressure. As soon as they can
build up a good enough civil practice
they are gone. hated to leave
but he only made $13,700 and he had
three children and a house to support.
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Another conversation went like this:
(Do you see the office as a career or a
stepping stone?)
I see this as a stepping stone for my
private practice. I want to do trial
work, so I'm picking up experience and
meeting people here. My private practice
is really developing and, in fact, I work
four nights a week and all day Saturday.
It would be a mistake for me to get locked
in here. I guess the average length of
stay is about two and a half to three and
a half years before young attorneys move
on. In fact, I almost left last September
after a year in the office, but I got into
some interesting work.
Two of the eleven prosecutors interviewed are career men,
of the other nine only one was interested in making a
career out of the office. He said:
I want to be as good a trial lawyer as I
can, because trying cases is just plain
fun. I wouldn't like any other kind of
work. Most of the attorneys who come
to the district attorney's office are
here up to five years, and then they
leave. But my attitude now is to stay.
It is true that the money is bad, but
I'm sure they will be more realistic
and the pay will get better.
Everyone gave the same reasons for leaving the
the office. An assistant district attorney leaves when
the outside opportunities he has -- primarily measured
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by income -- are greater than those provided by the
organization. This conversation was typical:
(Do you think of the district attorney's
office as a career?)
I would like to but there are some problems
involved. There is no great increase in
salary for the assistants, you know what the
pay scale is. We need some sort of step pay
so that it becomes reasonable. Another
problem is that you serve at the pleasure
of the district attorney. If he retires or
gets beaten in an election we are out of a
job. Not many of the assistants stay for
those reasons.
(Why do the assistants leave?)
The salaries are simply too low. Most of
the assistants are here to get some experience
and then make it on their own. I'm not as
anxious to leave as most. I don't do out-
side work to speak of and I'd like to stay.
But I would need some sort of step pay and
employment security.
A different assistant said:
(What would induce you to leave?)
It depends on what you were trying in the
office, and what is available in job op-
portunities on the outside. If someone
asked me to come and work for him tomorrow
for $100,000 I'd have to give it serious
consideration, but they're not.
The pay in the office is low because the jobs have
been structured by the state legislature as part-time
work. As a result all the assistants are expected and
encouraged to develop civil practices to help support
themselves. One of the career assistant district
attorneys told me.
I really harp at all the young guys to get
out and start their own practices at night
Sure it's hard to do, but if they don't do
it they will be forced to leave.
He indicated they will be forced to leave because the
salaries increase much slower than their families
economic needs. Without outside support they will have
to find a higher paying job.
The successful development of a part-time practice
puts further tension on the assistants. They need the
civil practice to support themselves, but when they do
develop an outside practice it may well provide the
opportunity needed to leave the office. As they become
more experienced their practice on the outside begins to
sustain them. When that happens they are in the position
to leave.
Despite the desires and pressures for district
attorneys to move on, a number of assistant district
attorneys do make a career out of the office. In this
office three men had been there about 15 years. The
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younger assistants don't understand why the older stay on.
When the pattern of leaving became apparent I asked one
of the young assistants why some of the older men stayed,
and the reply was, "I don't know, but tell me if you find
out." From interviews with the senior district attorneys
at least two reason for staying at the office became
apparent -- an investment of time and a belief that
working in the criminal justice system is an important
task.
I asked one of the assistant district attorneys why
he had remained with the district attorney's office. In
the process of answering the question he said:
...In any event, you get to the point
where you have made a hell of an in-
vestment. When I've had 30 years ex-
perience I will receive one-half my
salary plus one percentage point every
year I stay over 10 years. I get such
a good deal because, I'm a veteran.
That's 70% of my current salary. In
addition, my family gets some great
benefits in case I died. You have to
take these things into consideration.
He went on to say:
If I were younger, had fewer kids, and
didn't have any medical problems, I would
probably leave the office. But if you
look at the long stayers the pension
benefits become particularly important,
expecially for (another assistant
district attorney) and me.
In this situation the investment of time is a powerful
force inducing some to stay with the office.
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Another reason that an assistant district attorney
may make a career out of the district attorney's office
concerns their feelings about the importance of crime.
I asked one assistant district attorney why he had
stayed with the district attorney's office and he replied,
"I enjoy the work here, if I didn't like it I would
leave." After this statement he went on to describe the
current state of criminal justice. He clearly felt that
crime is a serious problem, and he planned on working to
curb it.
Becker and Carper (1956) interviewed three groups
of graduate students at a major university: engineers,
physiologists, and philosophers. They discovered that
different mechanisms induced the students to identify
with their occupation. Among the processes they noted
were (1) the development of a problem interest and pride
in new skills, (2) the acquisition of professional
ideology, (3) investment, (4) the internalization of
motives, and (5) sponshorship. In this district at-
torney's office at least two of these mechanisms lead
lawyers to identify themselves as assistant district




The state legislature created the structure of the
district attorney's office. Its salient features are
low pay and part-time employment. These features induce
a prosecutor to develop an outside practice. The primary
drawing card the office has for recruiting new members is
the excellent trial experience a prosecutor gets. After
two to three years in he office, however, an assistant
district attorney has gained as much trial experience as
possible. In addition he cannot expect to get any raises
in pay. The attorney finds himself in an organization
which can no longer meet his financial needs or pro-
fessional needs. There are no "heavier" cases to try.
The office structure strongly encourages the prosecutor
to leave. It is no surprise, therefore, that very few
attorneys view the office as a career opportunity.
Instead they will leave within three to five years after
joining the office. It is in this manner that the
organizational structure is closely linked to the career
patterns of the assistant district attorney.
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CHAPTER IV - THE INFLUENCE OF CAREER PATTERNS ON
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEYS
We have seen that assistant district attorneys enter
the office in order to gain trial experience. They do
not view the office as a career possibility. The natural
result of their perspective is a complete preoccupation
with "trial". The following conversation is a good
example:
Have you see any of my trials?
(Yes, I saw the rape case you tried
upstairs.)
That was a bad one. The girl just
wouldn't say that the defendant did it.
She qualified everything, she said. I
love trials. I'm just like an actor,
in fact, I was a salesman before I went
to law school. I love to work on my feet.
I really come alive when I go on trial.
When I'm trying a case, I go home and
don't need any sleep. This also gives me
a chance to see the best attorneys in the
state at work, so I can improve my skills.
I have the confidence now that I can do a
good job in trying any case.
For some reason the attorneys up north
seem to be the aggressive type. There
is one fellow up there who always starts
his plea to the jury, 'In my forty years
in the Bar, I have never seen such a
poor case as the district attorney's
office has brought against this defendant.
In my forty years, I've never seen such
flimsy arguments.' Another ploy this
fellow uses is to stand between his
defendant on the stand and me, but right
in front of the jury. Then he points at
me, and says to the defendant, 'You just
tell him the mistake he made.' Yes, I
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really love to try cases. Although I
do quite a bit of research, and read all
the Supreme Court and state supreme court
decisions, the thing I really love is to
try cases.
Another assistant district attorney explained:
All of us take on more or less the same
work -- ranging from initial paper work
to final disposition. There is such a
heavy work load, however, that we can't
do it all. I spend most of my time think-
ing about how to try cases. For example,
when I'm on a five day trial, I think over
the case at work, at home and even when
I'm sleeping. Often times I'm too busy
here at work to figure out my final
arguments and my opening statements, so
I do them at home. I am here because I
get the maximum amount of experience in
the shortest amount of time. The thrill
in this job is winning a case, although
it is true I learn more when I lose.
When I lose a case, I go back over it
and analyze it carefully so I don't
make the same mistake again.
The sentiments in these statements are common to
all the assistant district attorneys. All nine of the
prosecutors in the superior court division told me
about cases they had tried. When I sat in discussions
among prosecutors, they continually trade stories about
trials.
Most of them learn how to try cases through their
own experiences in the courtroom; however, other methods
are also used. One method is sitting in the courtroom
and observing. Invariably there was an extra pro-
secutor or two in the assignment session when I was
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there, and often someone observing in trial sessions too.
Another learning method they use is sharing
experiences. One assistant explained it like this:
The relationships in this office are not
one of competition, but rather one of
helping. We spend a lot of time discus-
sing cases. For example, someone will
ask, 'can you do such and such on a
motion?' Often I just hang around to
learn whats going on. In our office
we almost have to sit on top of each
other, which I think is a good practice.
It is going to ba disaster next fall if
we move into a new building and everyone
has their own separate office.
During one interview we were interrupted by an
attorney just returning from trial:
He (defense attorney) just keeps asking
the same questions over and over. He
kept giving me some trouble because I
refused to let him enter some information.
He would say to the jury, 'I'm just trying
to get at the truth in this matter, but
the district attorney won't let me.' So
I did the same thing to him. I brought up
something that was obviously inadmissable
and when he objected I said, "I'm just
trying to get at the truth in this matter."
He was furious, and I had to laugh. I don't
like to do things like that because I'm
trying his kind of case, but I had to do it
because the judge won't stand up to him.
This vignette scored an obvious educational point.
Improving the learning process also interests a few of
the prosecutors. One said:
I think one of the things that could really
help around here is if we had a more
efficient operation for information on the
new laws. For example, we could set up a
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loose leaf notebook that would have all the
important cases that come in from this state,
other states, and from the Supreme Court.
My observations indicate that attorneys new to the
office are more influenced by this preoccupation with
"trial". They do not yet have the trial skills they
desire. Yet after acquiring the skills in about two
years, economics dictate that they must begin to look
for work outside the office. Their part-time civil
practice begins to take up more time. As this happens
the focus of their professional energies may shift out-
side the district attorney's office. These comments
are "educated speculation" since my work only touched
this topic. The process of exit would be an ex-
cellent future study.
Assistant district attorneys come to the office to
try cases, so the trial becomes the most important part
of the assistant's work. The prosecutors, particularly
new ones, spend their time thinking about the cases
they are trying, observing others try cases, and listen
to the experiences of others. This preoccupation with
"trial" filters the way they view their world -- events
related to "trial" are important, events unrelated are
unimportant. This perception affects the administration
of justice as the next chapter will point out.
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CHAPTER V - CONCLUDING COMMENTS ON THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE
We have seen in the preceding chapter that "trial"
is the primary concern of assistant district attorneys.
The career patterns of the prosecutors reinforce one
norm of the legal profession stated in Chapter I, by
Lippman (1969):
Two counsel, acting as adversaries,
seek to obtain the best possible
disposition of a case for the interests
that they represent. However, this
tradition is not easily ameanable to
the operation of large organizations
which characterize urban criminal justice
administration.
The structure of the district attorney's office
creates an environment which nurtures a three to five
year term of service. During this time an assistant
district attorney first focuses his energies on trying
cases, and later on building an outside practice. They
become skilled court room practitioners. Thus, the
structure of the office strongly reinforces the profession#
al legal norm of relying on trial as the only means
to administer justice.
Unfortunately the district attorney's office must
be a bureaucratic organization to handle the placed on
it. Several problems came to light while I was visiting
the assignment session of the superior court. Summons
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to court were mailed to out-of-date addresses by the
office, even though the probation office had the up-to-
date addresses. Then when the defendant didn't appear in
court, an order for his arrest was issued. I was told
that policemen were warned to use discretion in arresting
defendants who had defaulted. Since the problem was
really incorrectly addressed mail, a person could easily
spend a night or a weekend in the cooler without having
done anything wrong.
Prisoners were brought into court from correctional
instititutions without receiving prior notice. If the
district attorney's office knew the prisoner's lawyer,
the office would contact him directly and inform him to
appear in court. On several occasions, however, the
prisoner had a lawyer the office didn't know about, but
was unable to contact because of the short notice. With-
out a lawyer, no business could be done and the prisoner
made the trip for nothing.
Each of the assistant district attorneys had over
100 cases at any one point in time. As a result it
was often impossible for him to be in the assignment
session when pre-trial motions came up; however, the
prosecutor reading the trial list was seldom informed
about the particulars of the case. As a result, it
was impossible for him to make any guiding recom-
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mendations to the court.
In this office there were only a few assistants
who were empowered to plea bargain with defense lawyers.
Usually it was difficult to find an assistant who had
the authority to plea bargain. Several experienced
court observers also felt that the sentences recommended
after plea bargaining were inconsistent.
One judge discussed the growing backlog of cases.
He explained it was partly due to the high urban crime
rate, but this was a factor other courts were able to
deal with. This court couldn't handle the proble due
to "inefficiencies in the district attorney's office."
He felt that cases were added to the trial list by the
office just to see what would happen. If things were
run better, he felt fewer cases would come into the
assignment session daily, and each case would be better
prepared.
Schein (1970) descibes three types of professional
careers. Custodianship is characterized by total
acceptance of the currently existing norms of the pro-
fession and by basic acceptance of the current levels of
knowledge and skill in that profession. Content Innova-
tion is characterized by acceptance of the traditional
norms of the profession pertaining to practice, but by
dissatisfaction with existing levels of knowledge and
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skill. Role Innovation is characterized by rejection of
some of the norms which govern the practice of the pro-
fession, combined with an interest in discovering the
ideal role of the professional in society. The role
innovator questions the traditional professional norms
in these ways: who is the legitimate client; who can
or should initiate the contact between client and practi-
tioner; what constitutes an appropriate setting for con-
ducting professional activities; and what are the legiti-
mate boundaries of the professional's area of expertise.
In my view the role innovator in the district
attorneys office would see that his professional duties
would include management of cases as well as trying
them before a judge and jury. He would think of prisoners
as his "client", and not have them transported into court
without adequate preparation. He would discover a better
method of contacting accused persons and bringing them
to court. He would consider visiting the prisons to get
information on defendants held there. He would expand
his area of expertise to include relevant parts of
management and public administration.
There are two major forces restraining the emergence
of role innovators -- professional norms and office
structure. The office structure influences assistant
district attorneys to view the office as only a short
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run career opportunity. A three to five year tour of
duty necessitates that a prosecutor expend his energies
trying cases and charpening his trial skills. It is
this myopic preoccupation with "trial" that directly
discourages role innovation. An assistant district
attorney does not view the problems previously mentioned
as important ones -- they have noting to do with the
trial of cases. In the reverse of the words of Frank
Lloyd Wright, "Function Follows Form". Both professional
norms and office structure must be altered if we are to
improve the quality of legal administration.
6o
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X - NOTES ON METHODOLOGY
The impetus for this study came from a meeting
I had with Professor John VanMannen late in September,
1973. Although I was primarily interested in the courts,
I heard that John had done some work with the police,
another important institution of the criminal justice
system. My previous study of the courts had occured
only in readings in the library and were of a managerial
and analytical bent. I had done quite a bit of previous
reading, but at this stage I was perplexed about what I
could do in a Masters Thesis. When I spoke with John,
he told me about participant observation studies of the
type he had previously done with the police. He also
warned me that a large amount of time that would have to
be invested if any work of this nature were to be useful.
This was a completely new tactic from anything I had
read about. I was intrigued because John's description of
participant observation made it sound similar to the work
I was doing in organizational development. This link to
other work I was doing and John's boundless enthusiasm
brought me onboard.
What Am I Doing?
When I first started visiting the courts in late
October, I didn't know specifically what I was doing.
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I went into the courts with the general notion of taking
notes, which I could then use to carve out a thesis.
At this stage there were two things that bothered me
about what I was doing. First, I had no hypothesis to
test. The feelings I had from my science/engineering
background indicated that the proper procedure was a
thorough literature search to generate a conceptual
framework. Then one tested this framework against the
real world. Isn't this the "scientific method"?
During the period of my initial visitation to the
courts, this feeling manifested itself in a strong need
to focus on a specific problem. With John's encourage-
ment I resisted this temptation and concentrated on what
was happening around me. I collected information once
or twice a week during November and December, and then
spent the entire month of January in the courts. Finally
in early February 1973 I began to narrow down the breadth
of this work. In mid-February I selected the assistant
district attorney as my focal point. Although it is
necessary to postpone narrowing your work -- one must
first find out what the important aspects of the institu-
tion -- I felt an inner complusion to focus from the
very beginning.
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A second source of uneasiness arose because I was
unsure if the participant observation study would provide
a sociological perspective or a dianostic perspective.
I was keenly interested in understanding the work culture
of the court officials, and the constraints they have to
deal with. These are vital in determining key leverage
points. At the same time I wanted to do some work which
would help the courts do a better job. As I am writing
these pages, this is still a live issue but I feel that
a participant observation stance probably allows one to
do both.
The Basic Mechanics
Because the first few months of the thesis provided
the time for understanding what was going on around
me in the courts, I wasn't faced with any conceptual
problems. I did have a great deal of difficulty, how-
ever, in dealing with the basic mechanics of the method-
ology. I didn't know anything about note taking -- when
to take notes, how much data to record, how to combine
note taking and interviewing. It wasn't until later that
I discovered the book by Schatzman and Strauss, Field
Research: Strategies For Natural Sociology. This book
provided a valuable prospective in the mechanics of the
situation. I took notes everywhere I went, except in
some of the trial sessions. In the assignment session,
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I had no difficulty from the very beginning; however,
in the trial sessions it became necessary to obtain
advance permission from each judge ahead of time to take
notes. The judge sometimes felt it would bother the
witnesses if they noticed me taking notes during the trial.
In many of the informal conversations it was impossible
to take notes, so I would write some brief reminders about
what went on in my daily journal. Often I could only
take down a few phrases, but after two months one word
in my journal would be enough to generate at least a
paragraph or more when I typed in the evening. There
were also certain situations in which it would be un-
thinkable to take notes, for example, when I sat in on
plea bargaining sessions. In these situations I had to
also rely on my memory.
The first few days in court where times when I
was inundated with data. Unfortunately, my field notes
did not reflect the richness of what I had been exposed
to. As a result, when I began going over my field notes,
I remembered many things which had not been recorded.
John pointed out that without better notes I could loose
much of the information. I also discovered that I had
the tendency to build quick and simple models about what
was happening around me. Although these models where
based on assumptions which should have been validated.
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I could build much better models in the evenings by
carefully examing all of the information over and
over again. One of the great problems I had to face
was whether or not I should type my notes in the
evening or dictate them. At first I typed them myself,
but I soon discovered it was much easier for me to
dictate them and cajole my wife, Karen, to transcribe
them for me later. Although this was the path of least
resistance it is also the more troublesome of the two.
It can take quite a while to peck out my nightly ten
to fifteen pages, but when I finished typing I immediate-
ly had the pages to examine for implications. I also
discovered that the process of typing my notes often
remined me of vignettes that occurred during the day
which I had forgotten. As a result, typing yielded
better information in quicker time, although it is pain-
ful and tedious to do. In actual fact, however, I
dictated more of my notes than I typed. This process
was aided immeasurably when a friend loaned me an extra
Norelco Dictating machine he had in his office. Although
it is nearly impossible to type off a small cassett
recorder -- Karen had to use her fingers simultaneously
to type and to run the tape recorder -- it is quite
easy to do it from a professional dictating machine. I
also wrote out some of my notes in long hand, which Karen
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typed. The process of typing the notes daily was a
tremendous chore. A typical day in January would include
eight hours of concentrated note taking in the courts,
which would leave me exhausted. When I came home at
night I would sit for another three to four hours taking
care of the dictating or typing. Often I was simply too
exhausted to do both, so a large amount of the typing was
done on the weekends.
The Problem of Access
I discovered the richness of the information I
collected in the courts depended almost entirely on the
interaction I had with the people who worked in the
courts. Although I did receive informal approval from
several of the judges in the assignment session, at no
point did I get formal approval to do this study. As
a result, the only access I had to any information was
the access people were willing to give me. There would
probably be few participant observation studies except
for the fact that people are naturally willing to talk,
particularly to someone who comes under the rubric of
student. A lot of what happens depends on luck. For
example the very first day I walked into the court, I
came early and asked a man in the court room how I could
learn about the courts. I explained that I was a student
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and told him what I was trying to do. It turned out
that he was the judge sitting in the assignment session.
He gave me a tremendous amount of encouragement and help.
On the other hand, the relationship can be very fragile.
One day there was obviously something going on between
the court officers and a new person who was moving in
and out of the judge's chambers. When I asked one of
the court officers what was happening, he looked at me
as if to say, 'What the hell business is it of yours!'
and turned away from me. I was crushed.
Eventually I was able to overcome these obstacles
because I became a farmiliar face. I visited the courts
daily and soon got to know all the people in the court
room on a first-name basis. Once I gained access to one
part of the court room, no one denied it to me again.
For example, the gate keeper for the district attorney's
office got to know me because I'picked up the trial list
every day from him. After a while, I began going into
the district attorney's office almost daily with one of
the assistant district attorneys. When the gate keeper
saw this happening, he soon began to let me in whether
or not I was with anyone. This is how I gradually gained
access into offices that were out-of-bounds to the
general public.
Time was in my favor here, but it can also work
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against you (especially in a study which is of short
duration, like mine). Feeling that my thesis deadline
was beginning to press in on me, I asked for information
from the district attorney's personnel records sooner
than I would have normally. Since I was not well-known
to the person in charge of these records at the time, he
denied my request. This denial then became the general
policy. I was unable to get the information that I
needed from this source.
Analysis
When I began to feel time pressure in mid-February,
I started to analyze the data I had collected. First,
I read the chapter, "Strategies For Analyzing" in Schatz-
man and Strauss (1973). They indicated that the most
important step in analyzing participant observation
data is to discover classes (things, person, and events),
then describe the properties which characterize them.
During this process, which they indicated should continue
throughout the research, the analyst gradually comes to
develop his own linkages between classes.
After reading this chapter, two topics jumped into
my head: the first relating organizational careers and
office structure, and the second examining the nature of
the linkage between the district attorney's office and
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police. I wrote a brief outline of these two al-
ternative studies and showed them to John. Although
both looked extremely interesting, the career study
appeared to be the most productive in the time allowed.
I immediately began three simultaneous operations.
I turned the focus of my court visits on the assistant
district attorneys. I started interviewing them around
seven general topics:
1. personal history
2. recruitment into the office
3. reasons for coming to the office
4. career opportunities in the office
5. what causes people to leave the office
6. life in the office
7. part-time work outside the office
The second operation was an immersion in work on organiza-
tional careers. The third operation was conducting a
literature search to find previous studies on the district
attorney's office.
In mid-April I began work on the initial draft.
A major step in this process was the generation of nine
alternative perspectives I could use in writing up this
thesis. The nine are listed below:
1. the organizational career
2. the process of promotion
3. one day in the life of an assistant
district attorney
4. how a case gets to trial
5. the trial of one case
6. the assignment session
7. plea bargaining
8. the district attorney's office structure
9. problems in the administration of justice
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Although many of these alternatives are only peripherally
related to careers, I had gathered quite a bit of infor-
mation on them as well. John and I agreed that the
organizational career alternative would be the most
interesting given the data I had collected.
While writing this thesis there were many times
when I wished I could go back into the interview and ask
additional questions. Unfortunately, my wish was
impossible due to time constraints. This difficulty
relates to my major criticism of the methodology I used.
Not enough time was spent analyzing the extensive data
I had collected in order to devise new observational
strategies. As a result my analysis occurred in lumps --
in mid-February and late April -- instead of continuously
throught the study. If I had consciencouly analyzed my
data every day, I feel a much more productive study would
have resulted in the same amount of time.
Time! Do Not Pass Go .
Many students may be afraid of doing a participant
observation theis because of the time involved. I
spent at least 250 hours collecting information on the
courts, and at least 250 additional hours typing, think-
ing, reading and writing about the courts. This was done
in a time period in which I was taking six courses for
74
credit and auditing one course in the Fall, and three
courses in the Spring. Although it did take quite a
bit of time, I enjoyed doing this research. It is an
exciting learning experience -- you come into a situa-
tion cold and nine months later you're an expert. The
conceptual material I read became much more meaningful to
me once it was grounded in the data of the courts. The
readings were not just an academic exercise, but needed
theory on an exciting topic.
To alleviate time problems, one solution would be
to begin a participant observation study during the
summer. If one didn't have to work and could maintain
contact with his thesis advisor this would be an excel-
lent alternative. The extra time available would probably
lead to much more valuable work.
Another possibility lies in writing a two-person
thesis. Besides having twice as much time available to
observe, the sharing of experiences and ideas would
speed the process of analysis. To some extent Karen
filled this role, but she never had a chance to visit
the courts. In any event, it was an extremely enjoyable
experience.
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- THE CRIMINAL COURTS
This section describes the operation of both
"superior" and "district" criminal courts, thus provid-
ing the framework in which the district attorney's
office is located. It focuses on the disadvantages of
being poor. Although it doesn't fit neatly into the
focus on the district attorney's office, it provides the
perspective I took into the superior courts in the fall.
According to the Presidents Commission on Law
Enforcement and The Administration of Justice (1967),
also known as the Crime Commission:
The criminal court is the central, crucial
institution of the criminal justice system
. . . The activities of the police are
limited or shaped by the procedures of the
court. The work of the correctional system
is determined by the court's sentence.
Because of it's primary role, we should begin with an
examination of the levels and processes in the crimin-
al courts. The courts are divided into two levels. The
Lower Court disposes of petty crimes -- "misdemeanors"
-- and process the initial stages of felony cases.
The Superior Court accepts those charged with felonies,
and tries them in a court of law. In addition there is
the separate Juvenile Court which processes juveniles
on an informal non-advocacy basis.
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After booking, the police bring the suspect to the
Lower Court for his "initial appearance". At this ap-
pearance the judge serves the defendant with formal
notice of the charge, and advises him of his rights. If
the offense is a minor one, it is usually tried im-
mediately with further processing. If the defendant is
charged with a felony, however, the judge sets bail.
The next step is a "preliminary hearing". In
most urban courts the initial appearance includes a
preliminary hearing. At this point, evidence against
the defendant is given a preliminary test. If the
charge is reduced to a minor one by the prosecutor, the
case will go straight to trial. In a case where the
judge finds probable cause for a felony charge, the
defendant will be bound over to the prosecutor or grand
jury for an "indictment". The defendant who raises bail
is set free to await indictment and a date for his
"arraignment" before the Superior Court. The defendant
who cannot raise bail goes to jail.
During arraignment the defendant makes his plea.
If he pleads not guilty, counsel is appointed for the
"indigent", the defendant elects trial by judge or by
jury, and the judge sets a trial date. If he pleads
guilty, the judge immediately pronounces sentence.
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Although there are unique differences among criminal
courts in different cities, counties and federal juris-
dictions all generally follow these guidelines.
Some comments are in order here about the personnel
who staff these courts, particularly the Lower Court.
These are taken from the Crime Commission Reports (1967):
There are judges, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, and other officers in the lower
courts who are as capable in every respect
as their counterparts in the more pres-
tigious courts. The lower courts do not
attract such persons with regularity, how-
ever. Judging in the lower courts is often
an arduous, frustrating and poorly paid
job that wears down the judge. It is no
wonder than in most localities judges in
courts of general jurisdiction are more
prominent members of the community and
better qualified than their lower court
counterparts. In some cities lower court
judges are not even required to be lawyers.
In a number of jurisdictions the State is
represented in the lower court not by the
district attorney but by a special pro-
secutor or by a police officer. Part-time
attorneys are sometimes used as prosecutors
to supplement police officers. In juris-
dictions where assistant district attorneys
work in the lower courts, they usually are
younger and less experienced men than the
staff of felony court. The shift of a
prosecutor from a lower court to a felony
trial court is generally regarded as a
promotion. Movement back to the lower
courts by experienced men is rare.
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The Crime Commission may have been overly generous.
The possibility of being tried by a judge who isn't
even a lwyer may come as a shock to many, but former
Senator Joseph Tydings (1971) explains that even in the
federal lower courts two of every seven judges did not
attend law school. According to Howard James (1967):
There are more than 15,000 men and women
presiding over lower courts and at least
10,000 are non-lawyers.
In the opening chapter of his book James characterizes
may lower court judges as "hacks", "retirees", "failures",
"inattentive", "misfits", "incapacitated", "inexperienc-
ed" , "lazy", "weak", and "prejudiced". He also suggests
that half the lower court judges are not fit for office.
The central problem of all courts, and particularly
the lower courts, is the tremendous caseload compared to
the facilities and personnel avialable to handle the case-
load. The Crime Commission (1967) reported that in 1966,
for example, the District of Columbia Court of General
Session had four judges to process the preliminary stages
of more than 1500 felony cases, 7300 serious misdemeanor
cases, 38,000 petty offenses and an equal number or
traffic cases. The situation in Chicago is hardly any
better. Oaks and Lehman (1968) report:
In 1964, the (twenty-two) courts now
comprising the Circuit Court of Cook
County terminated almost 1,900,000
criminal or quasi-criminal cases . . .
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the Municipal Department disposed
some 204,000 misdemeanor and ordinance
violation cases, over 800 per working
day. In addition it handled almost
17,000 preliminary hearings, about 50
per working day.
The inevitable consequence of this volume is a total pre-
occupation with the movement of cases. In effect this
problem creates the necessity of assembly line justice.
Guilt is not determined in detailed examination of the
facts in a trial, but rather in hallway administrative
decisions. The Crime Commission (1967) notes:
Partly in order to deal with volume, many
courts have routinely adopted informal,
invisible, administrative procedures for
handling offenders. Prosecutors and magis-
trates dismiss cases; as many as half of
those who are arrested are dismissed early
in the process. Prosecutors negotiate
charges with defense counsel in order to
secure guilty pleas and thus avoid costly,
time-consuming trials; in many courts
ninety percent of all convictions result
from the guilty pleas of defendants rather
than from trial.
Often the decision on negotiated pleas are carried out
under severe time constraints and not on the bases ,of
systematic procedures. Negotiations are conducted
privately between the prosecutor and the defendant or
his counsel. As a result there is no judicial review
of the process, the justice is determined by the relative
bargaining abilities of the prosecutor and the defendant
or his counsel. The judge usually rubber stamps the
plea and the sentence recommended by the prosecution.
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The most important sessions of most cases are conducted
in informal, hidden places away from the glar of due
process.
Skolnick (1967) suggests that the proper model of
criminal justice is not the adversary or competitive
model, but rather the cooperation model.
While the adversary system contemplates an
agressive defense, the 'cooperative' system
alters the nature of the services that the
defense attorney is capable of performing.
He may often act less as an advocate than
as a "coach" preparing his client to
meet the behavioral and attitudinal
standards of officialdom . . .
Under such circumstances, adjudication
does not define the adversary system,
but is instead the outcome of the failure
of pretrial negotion. . .
Skolnick concludes:
Moreover, in large cities the criminal
bar is small and tends, along with the
Public Defenders Office . . . to constitute
a closed system. Given the pressure of
the system to process vast numbers of cases,
cooperation and accomodation are highly
valued, with the result that most cases
are negotiated on the basis of informatal
norms developed in response to administra-
tive needs rather than legal principles . . .
The inherent administrative bias of Skolnick's
cooperation system is immediately apparent for the "in-
digent". Since counsel is appointed for the "indigent"
by a judge, the attorney who makes his livelihood could
hardly be expecte/ to rock the boat. The number of
attorneys who do a significant amount of trial work is
so small -- according to James (1967) -- fifty-five
lawyers in Cleveland try 82.3% of the criminal cases.
They quickly become part of the team. As a result there
may be less of a desire to stand up for his client's
rights in any single case, because retribution is bound
to occur on the next one.
Oaks (1968) provides information in Chicago that
tends to support this contention. In 1964 the Public
Defenders Office attorneys had 82% of their clients plead
guilty, while retained or other appointed counsel had
68% of their clients plead quilty. Even these figures
may hide the true facts because retained and appointed
counsel are lumped together. Most appointed counsel
would probably follow the same patterns as the Public
Defenders Office.
Administrative justice may even more directly pre-
vent a defendant from receiving due process under the
law. Since counsel is not appointed in the preliminary
hearing defendants who plead guilty have not had the
opportunity to consult an attorney. Skolnick (1969)
states:
For the many who have been inadequately
advised of their right to an attorney,
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their first appearance in court is also
likely to be their last. Most plead
guilty without consultation, often under
the implied threat of an additional stay
in jail if a further hearing for a plea
is required.
The defendant may also waive his rights to a jury trial
if he's smart, according to James (1967):
Just as there is a penalty for going to
trial rather than pleading guilty, there
is also a penalty for choosing the more
expensive and time consuming trial rather
than a bench trial. In one case the judge
stated on the record that he would have
sentenced the defendant to one year to
life in the penitentary, but because the
defendant had put the state to 'the trouble
of calling a jury . . . it will cost you
nine years additional because the sentence
is now ten to life in the penitentary.'
Another major obstacle preventing the "indigent"
from obtaining the same trial as the more affluent is
the question of bail. Although bail is recognized in the
law solely as a method of insuring the defendant's
appearance at trial, it is clearly used for other reasons
It is used to "break" crime waves, pretrial detention,
or punishment. Inability to make bail clearly falls with
heavy bias on the indigent. Foote (1954) shows that 68%
of the defendants in Philadelphia failed to make bail
at $1,000.00 while more recent studies reported in the
Crime Commission (1967) showed 45% fail at $1,500.00
in New York City.
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There are at least five reasons why inability to
make bail is a serious difficulty:
1. the forced isolation of jail, especially where
detention facilties are worse than penitentary
facilities for convicted criminals.
2. detention hinders the preparation of the
defense - Foote (1958) states that defendants
who make bAil are three times as likely to
recieve probation as those who do not.
3. a defendant who is unable to work is also
unable to support his family or more easily
pay for his defense.
4. a defendant may lose his job.
5. the defendant cannot settle his case out of
court or get it dropped.
Experiments in Chicago, New York and Washington,
D. C. have shown that defendants released on recognizance
have a "skip" rate as low or lower than conventional rates
for those who post bail. This information coupled with
the work of the Vera Institute in New York City and the
District of Columbia Bail Project, indicate that the
entire system of bail as it is currently practiced in
most criminal courts should be completely reworked.
Opposition to "easier bail" comes from those who
feel that society is endangered by all the criminals
(defendants) who would be released to walk the streets.
The Presidents Commission on Crime in the District of
Columbia (1966) has linked the length of time a defendant
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is out of jail to the probability of further crimes being
allegedly committed. The person simply has fewer chances
to commit crimes. Seven percent of all defendants re-
leased committed crimes within the first month of freedom.
These figures indicate the solution may lie in speedy
trials rather than preventive detention. Foote (1958)
states:
The fact is that we do not afford such
speedy trials today, but the failure of
the state to provide machinery for rapid
adjudication of criminal cases hardly gives
the same state clean hands in arguing for
pre-trial imprisonment to mitigate against
risks which it could mitigate.
The process of sentencing those found guilty
creates the last major problem for defendants. There
are three reasons why this poses a serious difficulty.
First, statutory regulations for sentencing often appear
to be full of anomalies. Frankel (1973) notes these
examples from recent state statutes:
1. A Colorado statute providing a ten year
maximum for stealing a dog, while another
prescibes six months and a $500 fine for
killing a dog.
2. In Iowa, burning an empty building could
lead to as much as twenty year sentence,
but burning a church or school carried a
maximum of ten.
3. Breaking into a car to steal from the glove
compartment could result in up to fifteen
years in California, while stealing the
entire car carried a maximum of ten.
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The second reason why sentencing is difficult re-
lates to the extremely long maximum sentences provided
in the laws. The Crime Commission (1967) stated:
The statutory lengths of sentences are
reflected in the sentencing practices of
the courts. More than one hald of the
adult felony offenders sentenced to state
prisons in 1960 were committed for a maximum
term of five years or more. Almost one third
were sentenced to terms of at least ten years.
And more than one half of prisoners confined
in state institutions in 1969 had been sen-
tenced to maximum terms of at least ten
years. There is a substantial question
whether sentences of this length are de-
sirable or necessary for the majority of
felony offenders.
The third difficulty in sentencing lies in the enor-
mous discretion left to judges in fixing the actual term
of imprisonment. Judge Frankel notes a few example from
federal law. The federal kidnapping law authorizes
"imprisonment for any term of years or for life." Rape
leads to "death or imprisonment for any term of years or
for life." Robbing a federally insured bank "not more
than 25 years." Even more common crimes such as driving
a stolen car across state lines may result in a term of
"not more than five years".
These statutory regulations restlt in sentences
dominated by individual judges. Judge Frankel under-
scores this point by citing the experience of Prison
Director James V. Bennett who states:
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Take for instance, the cases of two men we
received last spring. The first man had
been convicted of cashing a check for $58.40.
He was out of work at the time, and when his
wife became ill and he needed money for rent,
food, and doctor bills, he became the victim
of temptation. He had no past criminal
record. The other man cashed a check for
$35.20. He was also out of work and his
wife had left him for another man. His
prior record consisted of drunk charges and
a nonsupport charge. Our examination of
these two cases indicated no significant
differences for sentencing purposes. But
they appeared before different judges and
the first man received 15 years and the
second man 30 days.
This section of the appendix lays out the framework
for the administration of justice. It also points out
where the system in practice departs from a normative
model of the system. The district attorney's office can
influence the legal administration in a number of crucial
points: bring initial charges, plea bargaining, bringing
final charges, trying the case, and recommending sentence.
The improved functioning of these areas is the ultimate
goal of this thesis.
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